To many, the biggest shock has been President Mahmoud Abbas's resistance to return to the negotiating table. In a striking turnabout for a leader who built his political life around engagement with Israelis, close ties to the U.S. and faith in a negotiated two-state settlement, he has refused to resume direct talks despite American pressure until Israel agrees to both a comprehensive settlement freeze and clear terms of reference. He has obvious, immediate motives. Since late 2008, indignities have been piled upon him: the Gaza war, to which he was a passive spectator; the election of a right-wing Israeli government; the U.S. change of heart on a settlement freeze; and his own ill-inspired decision to postpone a UN vote on the Goldstone Report – condemning both Israel and Hamas for war crimes – which unleashed a wave of Palestinian and Arab criticism. More broadly, the Ramallah-based leadership feels vulnerable, challenged by Hamas, constituencies within Fatah and large segments of public opinion. Those hardly form propitious circumstances for risk-taking. Awaiting somebody else's next move seems the surer bet.
But it would be wrong – and, to Palestinians, profoundly misguided – to see in the leadership's current attitude a matter of mere personal frustration or political apprehension. If the political manifestation of the diplomatic paralysis is of recent vintage, its roots run deep. Abbas is among the last among his people to arrive at the point he has reached; he is the restrained and belated expression of a visceral and deep popular disillusionment with the peace process as they have grown to know it. There is equal disillusion with the U.S., a reflection not so much of the new administration but of a broader historical experience with Washington. That Obama has had to bear the brunt of Palestinian disenchantment is but one of the conflict's many ironies.
Neither the PLO nor its leadership has given up on negotiations. They have invested in them too much for too long, and their power depends too heavily on the process to accommodate a swift and radical shift. Nor have they deeply reflected about, let alone developed, realistic substitute strategies. Still, they have begun to give them some thought. They are focusing on three forms of action to increase their leverage and reduce their dual dependency: on Israel to end the occupation of its own volition and on the U.S. to pressure Israel to do so.
A first idea making headway is to turn to the international arena, where the balance of power tilts more in the Palestinians' favour. The suggestion of a UN Security Council resolution either endorsing the contours of a final settlement or recognising a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders is a prime example. Israelis resent or fear others as well, including Palestinian recourse to international legal bodies or boycott of settlement products. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad wishes to go about the goal of statehood in a different way: painstakingly building institutions from the ground up to prompt both international recognition and pressure on Israel to end the occupation. A newly re-politicised civil society in the West Bank, backed to a degree by the Palestinian Authority (PA), is pushing a range of hostile but largely non-violent initiatives directed at Israel as a path between the two dominant (and so far failed) paradigms of the past – peaceful negotiations and armed resistance.
See also Sydney Irresistible and Mike Hitchen Unleashed
Putting principles before profits
Putting principles before profits