Source: International Relations and Security Network (ISN)As destructive terrorist attacks within Pakistan become more frequent and inflation rises further, an increasing segment of the Pakistani population seems unwilling to continue to bear the perceived costs of their country's alliance with the US – and the seemingly never-ending 'war on terror'.
By Salma M Siddiqui for ISN Insights
Unfortunately, Obama's recent visit to India did not do much to bolster confidence in the painstakingly constructed image of the US as a genuine and constructive ally. In particular, his statement supporting India's role in the UN Security Council dissolved in the minds of many Pakistanis any misconceptions they may have had about who the closer friend is. Naturally, in the power politics of South Asia, sides have to be taken, and Obama's choice may indeed represent an economic triumph - but just as likely, a strategic disaster.
In the short term Obama's statements during his trip are not likely to impact Pakistanis directly. India is unlikely to become a permanent UNSC member anytime soon; the US has been supporting the memberships of Japan and Germany for years without any results, and indeed the UN General Assembly has failed to agree on an actionable reform proposal despite talks stretching back three decades.
As for the mention of the Kashmir issue, while disappointing - considering that Obama addressed it during his presidential campaign as one of the 'critical tasks' in need of resolution - the issue has not been critical to South Asian politics in the past years. Although it did not come as a surprise that he would use this opportunity to play a more proactive role in the conflict, analysts have been arguing for years that the US is unlikely to take a decisive role in its resolution due to the fraught US-Pakistani history over Kashmir, particularly the 1965 crisis that saw the US cut off aid to Pakistan. Obama therefore faces a delicate balancing act of seeking a workable role for the US on this issue, despite a difficult regional dynamic, while proceeding with the understanding that the aim of stabilizing the region will not be possible unless the Kashmir issue is resolved in an equitable fashion.
Lastly, Obama's call for Pakistan to do more in the 'war on terror' is now perceived as a 'routine procedure'. Considering that the need to do more has become a regularly repeated mantra, it is unlikely that Obama's statement was the last of such counsel. His emphasis on the importance of a stable Pakistan for India was, however, well received in the Pakistani media, although it was eventually drowned out by the more Indo-centric dimensions of the visit.
From disappointment to backlash
But the backlash to this visit, as seen from Pakistan, cannot be ignored: Not only has it aroused a sense of neglect among Pakistanis, but more significantly, it has clearly indicated the disposable nature of the US-Pakistani alliance in the face of India's economic lure. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry issued a statement following Obama's visit to India, saying: "Pakistan hopes the U.S. […] will take a moral view and not base itself on any temporary expediency or exigencies of power politics". This is an ironic statement given that in most circles the foundation of the US-Pakistani relationship is seen as transient and subordinate to the more ideologically and economically based relationship with India. Indeed, most Pakistanis acknowledge the 'almost special' nature of the US-India relationship, but find it unsettling because it leaves them insecure in the long run. Coupled with the 'war on terror', these insecurities can gain considerable weight.
Pakistan has undoubtedly suffered far more terrorist attacks than the US and India combined; yet locals, although acknowledging the role of domestic actors in perpetuating this violence, place the blame with Washington, sometimes even Indian intelligence agents. Such views are common not only among poor, uneducated Pakistanis, but increasingly across class structures, even among young urban intellectuals, traditionally more open to the West and the US in particular.
Levels of frustration are high and rising, as near-weekly blasts continue to wreak havoc in the country. Contrary to commonly heard reporting in the West, the result is not an increasingly 'Talibanized' Pakistan; there is a distinct broad-based consensus against terrorism, but after losing 30,000 citizens to the US-sanctioned 'war on terror', people are starting to lose their patience - and more significantly, their hope.
Overtures by the US are desperately needed in order to rebuild support for the fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups - especially in the aftermath of Obama's recent visit. "How are we supposed to trust that the US is our partner, if Obama came all the way to India and didn't even stop in Pakistan on the way - Lahore is only half-an-hour from Delhi!" a local student noted. "We are paying for this war with our lives and our money too it seems; a goat cost me Rs 4000 a few months ago, and this Eid, it is costing me Rs 25,000. Our government is clearly incapable of getting us out of this mess, and it seems America doesn't care we are in it," a shopkeeper complained.
Media buzz surrounding Obama's upcoming visit to Pakistan in March 2011 has already started, but it seems more like an afterthought to many.
Perceptions count
American policies that take into account Pakistani sensitivities are vital if a workable and secure alliance with Pakistan is to be maintained, and success in Afghanistan achieved. The accidental killing of three members of Pakistan's border control force (by ISAF forces), which led to NATO supply routes to Afghanistan being shut in October is just the most recent reminder of the fragility of this partnership.
Although Obama and his team may believe that Af-Pak is a single theater, several prominent actors in the region, including former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, have warned about the counter-productivity of expanding drone attacks beyond Afghanistan. In addition to endangering the role that Pakistan plays as a supply route to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, its potential future role as a facilitator in reintegration or reconciliation efforts with the Taliban in Afghanistan is increasingly under threat. Perhaps most alarmingly, Afghans, including President Hamid Karzai, are starting to view Pakistan's current situation as even more anarchic than their own. This should be a major source of concern for the US.
This war, perhaps more than any before, is fought over perceptions and with increasingly low morale. As insurgent groups and terrorist organizations gain ground, both the Pakistani and US administrations need to focus on countering the narrative that is causing many to sway. In a recent speech at the Atlantic Council, Musharraf highlighted this point by emphasizing the growing popularity of Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) charitable wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, after its successful involvement in the relief efforts following the 2005 earthquake and the recent floods. The LeT, he added, is particularly popular in Kashmir because it fights against the Indian army, accused of serious human rights violations in the region.
Kashmir is an important part of the regional puzzle, and progress on this front is absolutely necessary for a longer-term sustainable regional peace. In the short term, both administrations need to focus on building up confidence and morale among Pakistanis who continue to bear the brunt of the war. Not letting the US-Pakistani alliance fall to the wayside in the face of a lucrative relationship with India is key. The US must realize that if it is to withdraw from Afghanistan, not only must it ensure containment of the Taliban, but also avoid having Afghanistan turn into a proxy battlefield between the two South Asian giants.
Salma M Siddiqui is currently a Lecturer for the University of London International Programme in Islamabad. She is also a freelance writer and a graduate of the London School of Economics.
