By Shastri Ramachandaran* Courtesy IDN-InDepth NewsAnalysis
NEW DELHI (IDN) - Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani's re-assertion of the obvious – that his country will extend "full political, moral and diplomatic support" to Kashmiri people – is the first indication of the backlash that may follow the signing of the strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan.
Pakistan was expected to lose no time in sending out hostile signals after Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai's path-breaking mission to Delhi that ended on October 5.
The outcome of Karzai's visit, with far-reaching implications in the on-going realignment of regional powers and their military-diplomatic play in the trouble-torn country, certainly cannot be to Pakistan’s liking. Its civilian government and military brass, notably the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), can be counted upon to stir fresh trouble to make the going hard for the India-Afghanistan partnership.
Washington, too, may have reason to be unhappy with New Delhi taking the plunge to more proactively direct the course of developments in Afghanistan. Although, the U.S. and Pakistan have a blow-hot-blow-cold relationship, when it comes to critical tests, the U.S. has been unable to stand up to the Pakistani military establishment; and it has failed to check the depredations of terrorist groups operating either with Pakistani support or from Pakistani soil.
Therefore, India has reason to be disappointed with Washington and wary of its inability to thwart Pakistan's attempts to wreck peace and foment armed conflict in the region. This became all too clear when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once again made the distinction between "good terrorists and bad terrorists" after Admiral Mike Mullen pointed at the Haqqani terror network as being virtually an arm of Pakistan's ISI.
After Mullen's damning revelation, countries such as India and Afghanistan that expected Washington to step up pressure on Pakistan have been let down badly. Islamabad hit back at the U.S. to remind the world that the Haqqani network was a U.S. creation in decades past for fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
As a result, U.S.-Pakistan tensions worsened. But it also exposed that the Haqqani network – linked to the al Qaeda and the Taliban, and suspected to have had a hand in a series of terror attacks including on the U.S. and Indian missions in Kabul – was hand-in-glove not only with the ISI but also Washington.
In fact, Washington did not deny that it had been negotiating with leaders of the Haqqani network and lobbying for their inclusion in the government in Kabul. What the sound and fury of U.S.-Pakistan exchanges clarified beyond doubt was that Washington could not be trusted to stick to the right side in Afghanistan, including its own policies and commitments.
The U.S. made up with Pakistan, suggesting that the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the ISI might be working in tandem to bring round the Haqqani network to serve their agenda and keep Afghanistan destabilised. With a leading member of the Haqqani clan in U.S. custody – and, possibly as a negotiator – it emerged that the U.S.-Pakistan rift was not over Haqqani's terrorism.
Far from that, it was, among other things, a tussle between the U.S. and Pakistan for using the Haqqanis as an instrument of policy in Afghanistan. Clinton removed the last layer of doubt over this by implying that the Haqqanis qualified as "good terrorists" in the company of the CIA but as "bad terrorists" if they fell victim to Pakistan's machinations.
The high-voltage drama must have been most instructive to Delhi and reinforced its resolve to opt for an independent course in Afghanistan, throw its weight behind Karzai, and jointly seek Iran's cooperation in preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
The India-Afghan strategic partnership, particularly the decision to back Karzai in the period leading to the withdrawal of foreign troops in 2014, should be viewed in the context of these realities.
The most important part of the partnership is India's decision to mentor and train Afghan security forces. This signifies stepped-up Indian engagement with the security situation as well as with Karzai's friends and allies, especially in case of another civil war breaking out in Afghanistan.
Secondly, India is seeking to assert itself as a stakeholder in Afghanistan's stability and economic development premised on this. This is borne out by MoUs (Memoranda of Understanding) signed for mineral exploration and development of hydrocarbons. Thereby, the Indian stakeholder in Afghanistan would not be the government alone, but also Indian industry and investors. Afghanistan's vast untapped mineral reserves – including gold, copper, lithium, iron ore, cobalt, natural gas – hold enormous potential and acquiring a stake in these would give Indian involvement greater strategic depth.
Untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan are reported to be nearly $1 trillion. An internal Pentagon memo stated in June 2010 that Afghanistan could become the "Saudi Arabia of lithium," a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and BlackBerrys.
With a new partnership in place, New Delhi needs to move swiftly on establishing an access route to Afghanistan for trade and transit that is not dependent on Pakistan. This is critical for securing India's interests and investments as operationalising the airbase in Tajikistan – though of strategic value – would not serve the purpose of commerce.
*The author is an independent political and foreign affairs commentator based in New Delhi. A version of this article was carried by http://www.dnaindia.com on October 12, 2011.
