Source: ISSTension Over DRC-Elections a Failure of Early Warning
Nyambura Githaiga, Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Program, ISS Nairobi Office
Following presidential and parliamentary elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on 28 November, tension is mounting as results trickle in against a backdrop of electoral violence, allegations of electoral fraud and misconduct, and calls for the vote to be annulled. There is increasing fear of an outbreak of serious political conflict. And when this storm breaks, it will lend credence to early warnings of the elections being a tipping point for further instability in the DRC. It will also call into question the capacity of all stakeholders to translate early warning into early response to prevent violent conflict.
After the fact, key political players in the DRC will be blamed for their intransigent positions and statements at various points of this electoral process that may inadvertently have fuelled reactions of their supporters. At the same time, their supporters will be blamed for taking the law into their own hands and opting for a brute force variety of democracy. Opposition parties will be blamed for failing to provide a united front and thereby splitting the vote. The security sector will be blamed for a heavy-handed response to demonstrators in meeting force with force. International observers will be blamed for stoking the flames of unrest with condemning reports of fraud or congratulatory reports of due electoral process. It will be blamed for doing too little, too late. Within the international community, the Great Lakes regional bodies and countries will come under fire for either taking sides or being indifferent. As apportioning blame preoccupies the post electoral discourse, the storm will rage and further compound the suffering of millions in the DRC.
Preliminary results indicate a likely Kabila win and the opposition is calling for an annulment of the vote. Already clashes have been reported in areas like the capital Kinshasa with demonstrations as far-flung as in South Africa and in Brussels. With the existing tension, it is highly probable that at least in some parts of the country the announcement of the results will spark more public demonstrations. The fear is that security actors in the DRC and political opponents will meet these demonstrations with force creating a post-electoral crisis. How long the unrest will last and how severe it will be, remains dependant on the actions of Congolese leaders and their supporters. It is not too late for regional actors, via the auspices of the African Union and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, to engage in conciliatory efforts to prevent a standoff. Through the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Congo (MONUSCO), the National Mediation Commission of the Electoral Process (CNMPE) was also established in November in order for external efforts to complement this existing process.
Granted the electoral process left much to be desired and the outcome is likely to be unsatisfactory enough to be contested significantly. However, these elections took place in a context that created conditions for a perfect storm. Politically, since the DRC emerged from the war in 2003, it has been under the leadership of the incumbent, Joseph Kabila. He took over in 2001 after the assassination of his father, President Laurent Kabila, and was elected president with a 58% majority in 2006. Upon assuming office he launched his political strategy, ‘les cinq chantiers’ which referred to five key projects for socio-economic development and he also made an election promise to bring security to Eastern DRC. With negligible gains and unpopular alliances, his popularity seemed to dip in favour of opposition candidates like long time opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). Tshisekedi boycotted the 2006 elections and so his popularity is best gauged on his track record of mobilising supporters in public demonstrations, as was the case in the run-up to the elections.
Kabila has been at the helm with a majority in parliament through the support of an alliance of political parties formed in 2006. In that sense, his political advantage of incumbency, which comes with control of relevant state institutions, created a political context of uneven power in the country.
Security dynamics in the DRC are closely linked to the political. A post-war legacy of a high proliferation of illegal arms and the presence of illegally armed groups has continued to be a threat to stability in the DRC. Admittedly, efforts of the DRC government, MONUSCO and governments in the region have reduced the size of illegal groups and the circulation of illegal arms. Yet these groups continue to pose a threat to populations living in the affected areas. Some of the illegally armed groups are of Rwandese, Ugandan and Burundian origin. Despite their external agenda against their countries of origin, their association with local illegal armed groups and their involvement in illegal activities for survival has been to the detriment of the local population. The integration of local illegal armed groups into the Congolese army can at best be described as an incomplete security sector reform process with reports of rogue elements in the integrated army engaging in illegal activities. The presence of MONUSCO forces has only partially allayed security concerns with mass rapes and violent attacks on civilians taking place regardless of their presence. Those from the affected areas, who also strongly supported Kabila’s 2006 bid, are disillusioned with the persistent insecurity hampering their local economy and infringing upon their rights to residence and mobility.
The socio-economic dynamic permeates nationwide. Whilst the political dynamic differs from region to region just as the security concerns weigh more heavily on the Eastern parts, the socio economic dynamic is indiscriminate. Kabila’s ‘cinq chantiers’ have not translated into substantive development in the sectors of infrastructure, health and education, water and electricity, housing and jobs. From Kinshasa to Bukavu, there are significant challenges in the state of the roads, the supply of regular electricity and running water, affordable healthcare, quality education and housing. According to World Bank statistics, 71% of Congolese live below the national poverty line. With an estimated population of 70 million, that means 50 million people are living below the poverty line. The irony lies in the fact that the DRC has abundant wealth in its reserves of diamonds, copper, cobalt, gold, coltan, tin and zinc. These reserves have not benefited majority of the population due, in part, to the war that prevented gainful exploitation and the now largely informal and unregulated mining industry that is prey to illegal or self-seeking exploiters. For the majority of the Congolese, their daily struggles likely influenced their voting patterns to favour the candidate they felt would improve their socio-economic prospects. This link between politics and economy is also well illustrated by the legislative polls, where 18 500 candidates competed for 500 national assembly seats. For some, being a candidate was about access to money and power to advance their individual economic situation by any means possible.
These dynamics of politics, security and socio-economics were mutually reinforcing in creating the conditions we see today. The electoral process in itself also contributed to rising tension. In January 2011, the constitution was amended to introduce a single plurality vote instead of the former two-round voting system for presidential elections. This set the stakes higher with the winner of the presidential bid requiring only to defeat his opponents without the recourse of a run-off that may have created alliances to upset the final outcome. Another highlight of the electoral process that has turned up the heat is electoral conduct. Tshisekedi’s penchant for provocative statements, like declaring himself already president in an interview on 6 November 2011 and proclamations that he will not accept any other outcome other than his win, have received criticism as being inflammatory and likely to incite his supporters to protest the outcome with the potential for post electoral violence. His supporting party, UDPS, the only party not to sign the electoral code of conduct, has been active in public demonstrations that have on occasion turned violent. A final issue was the extreme logistical challenges leading up to the elections and the resolve of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) that the elections take place as scheduled, against the odds. Logistics were complex given the limited transport infrastructure across this country of 2.3 million square kilometres, pockets of insecurity, and delays. Delays plagued voter registration, publishing location of polling stations and the acquisition and disbursement of election materials.
As the DRC awaits results, it is clear that beyond the post-electoral storm, the conditions that created it will persist as obstacles between the resource wealth of the DRC and the well being of its citizens.
