Brazil: Brazil military masses against drug trafficking

The Brazilian military has sent thousands of troops to the country's Western border to combat drug and weapons smuggling.

The operation involving the country's army, navy and air force is meant to target illegal activities and exert more control over its vast borders.

Al Jazeera's Gabriel Elizondo reports from Sao Paulo.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Gunfire Continues Across Armenian-Azeri Lines

This article originally appeared in the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net

Gunfire Continues Across Armenian-Azeri Lines

Lasting ceasefire punctuated by lethal shootings.

By Karine Ohanyan, Lusine Musaelyan - Caucasus

CRS Issue 619,

Although a ceasefire has held in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict since 1994, the peace is frequently interrupted by bouts of gunfire. In the latest tragic incident, two young Armenians were killed by shots fired from the other side of the “line of control”.

Aren Simonyan was killed on November 19 and Mihran Margaryan the following day. Both were members of the Karabakh Armenian military and at 19, would only have been toddlers when the conflict was in full swing.

At the end of the war, Armenian forces retained control of all of Nagorny Karabakh – an Armenian-majority region inside Azerbaijan in Soviet times – and also of surrounding areas of land. Because the sides cannot agree on how a final settlement should look, no peace agreement has been signed, despite efforts by mediators from Russia, France and the United States who make up the so-called Minsk Group.

Hopes were high that a summit in Russia in June might produce a breakthrough, but once again nothing came of it.

Officials in Karabakh and in Baku each regularly accuse the other side of breaking the ceasefire, commonly with the kind of sniper fire that left Simonyan and Margaryan dead.

Azerbaijan is committed to regaining control of Karabakh and the adjoining areas now held by the Armenians. This, plus Baku’s massive arms spending underwritten by oil revenues, increases Armenian suspicions about its intentions.

The Karabakh Armenian defence ministry suggested that the deaths of the two soldiers reflected plans by Azerbaijan to step up its military presence, and promised to respond accordingly.

“This incident… confirms yet again that not only does Azerbaijan not respect efforts by international mediators to reach a peace deal, it is also taking steps to increase tensions in the region. This circumstance obliges Karabakh to take tougher actions of its own and respond in kind,” a statement from the ministry said.

In response to what they see as the deliberate targeting of civilians by Armenian snipers, the Azerbaijani authorities have recently begun building walls to protect villages located close to the line of control. When IWPR reported on this issue from the Azerbaijani side, villagers there said their homes were regularly targeted by snipers. (See Azeris Wall Off Front-Line Zones on this.)

Villagers in Armenian territory make almost identical complaints about Azerbaijani sniping.

The village of Talish in the Martakert region is about five kilometres back from the line of control, but residents say they frequently come under fire. One man, Vilen Petrosyan, said the shooting became more frequent during the seasons when farmers were out at work, and more exposed.

“Of course the gunfire has become an everyday thing for us, and the danger is ever-present,” he said. “It isn’t just people who suffer, but also our livestock. My brother got injured in the stomach, and only survived by a miracle. We who live here have no sense that there’s a ceasefire at all.”

Such is the level of mutual mistrust that on the Armenian side of the dividing line, officials and residents suspect that the walls are intended to provide cover for Azerbaijani sharpshooters.

“Not only is Baku is doing this in a bid to present itself as the victim, but it could even use these walls to conceal snipers,” David Babayan, spokesman for the president of Karabakh, said.

At the same time, Babayan suggested that the walls could be seen as a tacit recognition of Karabakh and its boundaries.

“You can welcome the initiative in one way, since a wall like this effectively gives the borders a clearer form,” he said.

In Armenia itself, Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan was just as sceptical about Azerbaijan’s justification for its walls.

“The wall is the physical embodiment of Azerbaijan closing itself off from reality,” he said. “The wall protects Azerbaijan from… [mediators’] requests for it to remove its snipers from the line of control.”

Karen Bekaryan, head of the European Integration NGO in Yerevan, said that the wall was a “paradox”.

“If its aim really is to protect against sniper fire, then why won’t Azerbaijan agree to the mediators’ suggestions that snipers should be withdrawn from the front line?” asked.

For ordinary people living close to the front line, the wall symbolises mistrust of the other.

Zaven Avetisyan, a resident of Mataghis in Karabakh’s Martakert district, said he was delighted that the Azerbaijanis were putting up walls.

“The more they are separated from us, the better. Then neither of us will ever see the other,” he said. “We won’t see them, and they won’t see us,

Karine Ohanyan is the Russian-language editor of the Armedia news agency in Yerevan. Lusine Musaelyan is a correspondent for RFE/RL in Nagorny Karabakh.

South Africa: Strengthening the Promotion and Protection of Child Rights in Southern Africa

Source: ISS

Irene Ndungu, Consultant Researcher and Sandra Adong Oder, Senior Researcher, Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

At a recent regional conference held between 14 and 16 November 2011 in Midrand, South Africa, a collaborative regional network on promoting the right of children was inaugurated with the main objective of strengthening the advocacy and protection of the rights of children in the region.

Its aim is to ensure a safe and secure future for children who suffer from abuse and human rights violations, and to have a positive and direct impact on their lives. The need for such a collaborative network is informed to some extent by the increased awareness that in spite of the impressive international legal frameworks on child protection, children’s rights have yet to be fully consolidated in the region.

Many practices still exist in the region that continue to violate the rights of children. Cases of sexual, physical and emotional abuse; the exploitation of children’s labour; and practices of harmful, cultural and traditional practices continue unabated. Over the last ten years numerous additions have been made to the body of international humanitarian and human rights law aimed at protecting the rights of children. Yet, practitioners, actors and governments are often unaware of the breadth of these new instruments and their methods of implementation. Usually, their focus is on raising awareness of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the tool most widely utilised by actors in the field.

The CRC and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), which form the bedrock of child protection in Africa, call for states to mainstream the provisions of these instruments within their national legislations and to submit regular reports on how they are being implemented. The reports are supposed to be submitted to the Committee on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (every five years) and to the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (every three years).

Rarely, however, do countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region make regular submissions, and according to UNICEF, ‘many still lack the necessary laws, legal systems, and enforcement mechanisms to protect their children against violence and abuse’.

To launch a regional network in such circumstances, one must therefore have enormous confidence and a belief that a shared sense of purpose could best be achieved through strengthening rather than altering the existing governance and human rights framework in the region. Countries need to be encouraged not merely to satisfy reporting requirements, but rather to reinforce the understanding of the consequences of not protecting and promoting the rights of children.

Granted, most states in the SADC region have signed or ratified international child rights protection instruments, but some have yet to do so. Countries such as Zambia, for instance, have yet to ratify the ACRWC, even though it has ratified the CRC. Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe have also yet to sign or ratify the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Ponography in addition to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which South Africa has also yet to sign or ratify. The Democratic Republic of Congo has also yet to ratify the African Charter. Countries that have not signed these protocols should do so and as a whole, countries need to commit to making regular submissions regarding their progress on implementing provisions spelt out in these frameworks to the respective children’s rights committees.

It should be noted that advocacy and policy advice by themselves have limited utility. Governance issues, access to service delivery, shared growth through job creation and economic justice, marginalisation and youth under-employment in the region are concerns that have to be tackled, while a more balanced perspective on ‘who’ children and youth actually are, will help to create more effective and active engagement in addressing their needs. David Nosworthy, an expert on children and armed conflict, notes that casting children as helpless victims does not help in establishing a better understanding of how they are experiencing security and development, and the coping mechanisms that they themselves are deploying. He affirms that underestimating children undermines their own ability to contribute to their healthy development and ignores the fact that they are the holders of specific rights that recognise their dependency, development stage and protection needs.

In the SADC region, most issues affecting the child are cross-cutting and thus are scattered over the different thematic concerns of the regional body. Consequently, there is no one instrument on child protection for the region, as is the case, for instance, with the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. The Gender Protocol, among other things, ‘encompasses commitments made in all regional, global and continental instruments for achieving gender equality and enhances these instruments by addressing gaps and setting specific measurable targets where these do not already exist’. A similar protocol on child protection (which is currently lacking) would be useful as it would streamline the various child protection obligations and make it easier to monitor compliance among SADC states.

SADC also needs to identify mechanisms for collaborating on trans-boundary challenges affecting children such as displacement as a consequence of the different migration typologies, child trafficking and security issues. The collaborative network on child protection will arguably be critical in this regard. It should also include monitoring of the attainment of civil rights and freedoms of children, health and welfare, education, cultural practices and special protection of children in conflict with the law or in situations of emergency, as provided for in international, regional and national legal instruments.

It is unfortunate that child protection issues often get placed on the back burner of the policy priorities of most governments in the SADC region, while budgetary allocations for children’s programmes are often inadequate. Thus, governments in the region need to ensure sufficient budgetary allocations for implementing child-related policies and adopt child-rights-based socio-political and economic programming approaches that would militate against child rights violations. This will also positively impact on the attainment of Millennium Development Goals. With the forthcoming Conference on Climate Change in Durban, it is important that countries also remain sensitive to the vulnerability of children to the effects of climate change and be mindful of these when setting goals.

Strengthening child rights protection remains an on-going challenge for the SADC region, but adopting both a regional and whole-systems approach in advocating for child rights protection will go a long way towards mitigating human rights violations as they affect Southern Africa’s children. One as such cannot imagine the response of the region to this network without a spectre of optimism and that is why the child rights protection and promotion discourse and the timing of the proposed regional network is a defining moment for the promoting the rights of children in southern Africa.

Malaysia: Malaysian court to submit documents on Bush, Blair crimes to UN

Source: IRNA

Kuala Lumpur, Nov 26, IRNA – A Malaysian war crimes court will submit documents on crimes committed by the former US president George W Bush and the UK ex-premier Tony Blair in Iraq to the United Nations.

The court will also inform the UN of the verdict issued for Bush and Blair by a symbolic war crime tribunal session held in Malaysia recently.

Talking to IRNA, a Malaysian law expert who was present in the symbolic court said that the final verdict issued for these war criminals will be submitted to the coming session of the UN General Assembly.

Sing said the holding of the symbolic court and the verdict it issued aimed at speeding up the process of ending the US occupation of Iraq.

He noted that though the verdict issued by the court was just a symbolic one, the documents used for it were so authentic and reliable that they could be used in any real tribunal in future.

India: Three Years After 26/11

B.RAMAN

See also: www.southasiaanalysis.org

The 26/11 terrorist strikes led to five important decisions by the Government of India--- to decentralise the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) by setting up regional hubs, to set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to investigate terrorist incidents of a pan-Indian nature, to strengthen coastal security,to create a national intelligence grid to serve as a data-base accessible to all agencies---- at the central and State levels--- dealing with counter-terrorism, and to set up a National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC), to take co-ordinated follow-up action on all terrorism-related inputs flowing from the intelligence agencies and the police.

2. The NSG has already been decentralised and regional hubs have come into existence. This has been done because of the delayed deployment of the NSG during the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The then totally Delhi-based NSG was slow to move and equally slow to react and its ability to co-ordinate with the local police and other security agencies in Mumbai was found wanting.

3. With the deployment of units of the NSG in big metro centres now, there is an expectation that the deficiencies witnessed on 26/11 will not recur now. If this is really so will become evident only when there is another act of mass fatality terrorism.Fortunately, we have not had one since 26/11. As a result, the proclaimed ability of the NSG to move faster and with greater effectiveness now is yet to be tested. It is important that the NSG’s training pays attention to the need to sharpen its institutional reflexes and that it keeps constantly interacting and rehearsing with the local police and other security agencies.

4. The NIA, which is already functioning, has had a lethargic and confused start. It is not clear to objective counter-terrorism analysts as to when and how it will be called into action. One has reasons to suspect and fear that like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) the NIA is tending to become a partly professional and partly politicised agency, which is sought to be used by the Government of India as a stick to beat the opponents with. It has shown greater alacrity and enthusiasm in looking into terrorist incidents in which some Hindus were suspected than in investigating cases where jihadi terrorists---indigenous or externally-sponsored---were suspected. Its record till now in successful investigation has been disappointing due to excessive political control over its functioning. It was expected to be an independent agency which will move on its own after a major terrorist strike. The expectation has been belied so far.

5. The steps already taken to strengthen coastal security have not yet contributed to an increase of our alertness to possible sea-borne threats. The shocking lack of reflexes on the part of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the intelligence agencies and the Police during a recent incident when an abandoned foreign ship managed to drift into our coastal waters without being noticed by any of these agencies speaks disturbingly of the continuing poor state of our coastal defence. Our capabilities for maritime counter-terrorism---whether by way of improved intelligence collection or physical security or alert mechanism---- seem to be as poor as they were before 26/11.

6. The decisions to set up a National Intelligence Grid and the NCTC have not yet been implemented---reportedly due to a lack of convergence of views among the various agencies and Ministries that would be involved in the implementation of these decisions as to how to go about it. The implementation process has been lethargic and glacial.

7. Fortunately, we have not had any major act of mass fatality terrorism ( with fatalities of more than 100) since 26/11. However, despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive and investigative capabilities since 26/11, we have had five acts of low or medium fatality terrorism after 26/11 in Pune, Mumbai, Delhi and Varanasi. Despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive capability, none of them could be prevented and despite the proclaimed strengthening of our investigative capabilities none of them could be successfully detected.

8. We are clueless as to who committed them, how many undetected cells are operating, are they indigenous or Pakistani, wherefrom are they getting their explosives, detonators and triggering mechanism etc. While our preventive capability has generally been below par, our investigative capability used to be good. This too seems to have deteriorated now due to politicisation and communalisation of the investigation process.

9. An equally worrisome aspect is the seeming deterioration in our TECHINT capability. While our HUMINT capability was not satisfactory, our good TECHINT capability made up for our HUMINT deficiencies------ contributing to successful neutralisation of new cells and successful investigation of terrorist strikes. The detection of the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects has become weaker after 26/11. As a result, good TECHINT is no longer compensating for the poor HUMINT. My assessment is that our terrorism-related intelligence collection capability today is weaker than it was before 26/11.

10. A reason given for our failures to detect the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects after 26/11 is that the terrorists now have access to better communication technology and gadgets and have better evasive capability and that, consequently, they have become smarter. I do not buy this explanation. I have not seen any evidence to support this. Our poor performance after 26/11 is not because the terrorists have become smarter, but it is because our agencies have become less smart than the terrorists.

11. We are yet to find an effective way of dealing with the sanctuaries of the terrorists in Pakistan. While our peace initiatives are welcome, they are not going to induce Pakistan to act against these sanctuaries. The peace process has to go hand in hand with a counter sanctuary process through deniable covert actions. Peace does not mean surrender or resignation. Peace means willingness to talk without letting it dent our courage and readiness to act against the sanctuaries. Action to create a counter-sanctuary capability continues to be totally neglected.

12. The continuing deficiencies in our counter-terrorism thinking and reflexes is due to a disinterested approach on the part of the Congress as well as the BJP. Both are equally guilty of politicising and communalising counter-terrorism. Both are equally guilty of failures to build up our counter-terrorism capabilities. The public is equally disinterested. There is hardly any meaningful debate on the issue either in the parliament or in our media or in public fora. The beneficiaries are the terrorists.

13. The public has to sit up and exercise pressure on the political class. The voters have to make it clear to the political class that their counter-terrorism record will be an important factor in influencing voter preference. Unless the public stirs itself up and moves, the political class is not going to move. (26-11-11)

The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies.

Syria: Uncharted Waters - Thinking Through Syria’s Dynamics

Source: International Crisis Group

The Syrian crisis has entered its most dangerous stage, requiring urgent attention to issues that the international community and Syrian opposition have largely been ignoring.

The crisis may or may not be in its final phase, but it is now defined by an explosive mix of heightened strategic stakes tying into a regional and wider international competition on the one hand and emotionally charged attitudes, communal polarisation and political wishful thinking on the other. As dynamics in both Syria and the broader international arena turn squarely against the regime, reactions are ranging from hysterical defiance on the part of its supporters, optimism among protesters that a bloody stalemate finally might end, heightened fears of sectarian retribution and even civil war among many, to triumphalism among those who view the crisis as an historic opportunity to decisively tilt the regional balance of power.

Yet, almost entirely missing is a sober assessment of the challenges provoked by these shifts and the very real risk that they could derail or even foreclose the possibility of a successful transition. Crisis Group’s new briefing, Uncharted Waters: Thinking Through Syria’s Dynamics, analyses the five key issues and makes policy recommendations on them for Syrian and international actors:

• the fate of the Allawite community;
• the connection between Syria and Lebanon;
• the nature and implications of heightened international involvement;
• the long-term impact of the protest movement’s growing militarization; and
• the legacy of creeping social, economic and institutional decay.

To read the full briefing, please click here.

Iran: Iran Contra at 25 - Reagan Briefed In Advance on Each Group of Missiles Sold to Iran. Read The Documents

President Reagan motioning to Ed Meese at the White House Press Briefing announcing the Iran-Contra connection. 11/25/86.Source credit: Courtesy Ronald Reagan Library

Bush Chaired Secret Committee that Recommended Mining Harbors of Nicaragua

Washington D.C., November 25, 2011 – President Ronald Reagan was briefed in advance about every weapons shipment in the Iran arms-for-hostages deals in 1985-86, and Vice President George H. W. Bush chaired a committee that recommended the mining of the harbors of Nicaragua in 1983, according to previously secret Independent Counsel assessments of "criminal liability" on the part of the two former leaders posted today by the National Security Archive.

Twenty-Five years after the advent of the "Iran-Contra affair," the two comprehensive "Memoranda on Criminal Liability of Former President Reagan and of President Bush" provide a roadmap of historical, though not legal, culpability of the nation's two top elected officials during the scandal from the perspective of a senior attorney in the Office of Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh. The documents were obtained pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by the National Security Archive for the files compiled during Walsh's six-year investigation from 1987-1993.

The posting comes on the anniversary of the November 25, 1986, press conference during which Ronald Reagan and his attorney general, Edwin Meese, informed the American public that they had discovered a "diversion" of funds from the sale of arms to Iran to fund the contra war, thus tying together the two strands of the scandal which until that point had been separate in the public eye. The focus on the diversion, as Oliver North, the NSC staffer who supervised the two operations wrote in his memoirs, was itself a diversion. "This particular detail was so dramatic, so sexy, that it might actually-well divert public attention from other, even more important aspects of the story," North wrote, "such as what the President and his top advisors had known about and approved."

The criminal liability studies were drafted in March 1991 by a lawyer on Walsh's staff, Christian J. Mixter (now a partner in the Washington law firm of Morgan Lewis), and represented preliminary conclusions on whether to prosecute both Reagan and Bush for various crimes ranging from conspiracy to perjury.

On Reagan, Mixter reported that the President was "briefed in advance" on each of the illicit sales of missiles to Iran. The criminality of the arms sales to Iran "involves a number of close legal calls," Mixter wrote. He found that it would be difficult to prosecute Reagan for violating the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) which mandates advising Congress about arms transfers through a third country-the U.S. missiles were transferred to Iran from Israel during the first phase of the operation in 1985-because Attorney General Meese had told the president the 1947 National Security Act could be invoked to supersede the AECA.

As the Iran operations went forward, some of Reagan's own top officials certainly believed that the violation of the AECA as well as the failure to notify Congress of these covert operations were illegal-and prosecutable. In a dramatic meeting on December 7, 1985, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger told the President that "washing [the] transaction thru Israel wouldn't make it legal." When Reagan responded that "he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages," Weinberger suggested they might all end up in jail. "Visiting hours are on Thursdays," Weinberger stated. As the scandal unfolded a year later, Reagan and his top aides gathered in the White House Situation Room the day before the November 25 press conference to work out a way to protect the president from impeachment proceedings.

On the Contra operations, Mixter determined that Reagan had, in effect, authorized the illegal effort to keep the contra war going after Congress terminated funding by ordering his staff to sustain the contras "body and soul." But he was not briefed on the resupply efforts in enough detail to make him criminally part of the conspiracy to violate the Boland Amendment that had cut off aid to the Contras in October 1984.

Mixter also found that Reagan's public misrepresentations of his role in Iran-Contra operations could not be prosecuted because deceiving the press and the American public was not a crime.

On the role of George Herbert Walker Bush, Mixter reported that the Vice President's "knowledge of the Iran Initiative appears generally to have been coterminous with that of President Reagan." Indeed, on the Iran-Contra operations overall, "it is quite clear that Mr. Bush attended most (although not quite all) of the key briefings and meetings in which Mr. Reagan participated, and therefore can be presumed to have known many of the Iran/Contra facts that the former President knew." But since Bush was subordinate to Reagan, his role as a "secondary officer" made it more difficult to hold him criminally liable.

Mixter's detailed report on Bush's involvement does, however, shed considerable light on his role in both the Iran and Contra sides of the scandal. The memorandum on criminal liability noted that Bush had a long involvement in the Contra war, chairing the secret "Special Situation Group" in 1983 which "recommended specific covert operations" including "the mining of Nicaragua's rivers and harbors." Mixter also cited no less than a dozen meetings that Bush attended between 1984 and 1986 in which illicit aid to the Contras was discussed.

Despite the Mixter evaluations, Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh continued to consider filing criminal indictments against both Reagan and Bush. In a final effort to determine Reagan's criminal liability and give him "one last chance to tell the truth," Walsh traveled to Los Angeles to depose Reagan in July 1992. "He was cordial and offered everybody licorice jelly beans but he remembered almost nothing," Walsh wrote in his memoir, Firewall, The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. The former president was "disabled," and already showing clear signs of Althzeimers disease. "By the time the meeting had ended," Walsh remembered, "it was as obvious to the former president's counsel as it was to us that we were not going to prosecute Reagan."

The Special Prosecutor also seriously considered indicting Bush for covering up his relevant diaries, which Walsh had requested in 1987. Only in December 1992, after he had lost the election to Bill Clinton, did Bush turn over the transcribed diaries. During the independent counsel's investigation of why the diaries had not been turned over sooner, Lee Liberman, an Associate Counsel in the White House Counsel's office, was deposed. In the deposition, Liberman stated that one of the reasons the diaries were withheld until after the election was that "it would have been impossible to deal with in the election campaign because of all the political ramifications, especially since the President's polling numbers were low."

In 1993, Walsh advised now former President Bush that the Independent Counsel's office wanted to take his deposition on Iran-Contra. But Bush essentially refused. In one of his last acts as Independent Counsel, Walsh considered taking the cover-up case against Bush to a Grand Jury to obtain a subpoena. On the advice of his staff, however, he decided not to pursue an indictment of Bush.

Among the first entries Bush had recorded in his diary (begun in late 1986) was his reaction to reports from a Lebanese newspaper that a U.S. team had secretly gone to Iran to trade arms for hostages. "On the news at this time is the question of the hostages," he noted on November 5, 1986. "I'm one of the few people that know fully the details. This is one operation that has been held very, very tight, and I hope it will not leak."

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Read the Documents:

Document 1, Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
Office of the Independent Counsel, C.J. Mixter to Judge Walsh, "Criminal Liability of Former President Reagan," March 21, 1991, 198 pages.

In this lengthy evaluation, Christian Mixter, a lawyer on the staff of the Independent Counsel, provides Lawrence Walsh with a comprehensive evaluation of the legal liability of President Ronald Reagan in the Iran-Contra operations. The memorandum reviews, in great detail, not only the evolution of the operations, but Reagan's central role in them. It includes "a summary of facts" on both the sale of arms to Iran, in order to free American hostages held in Lebanon, and the evolution of the illicit contra resupply operations in Central America, as well as the connection between these two seemingly separate covert efforts. The report traces Reagan's knowledge and authorization of the arms sales, as well as his tacit authorization of the illegal contra resupply activities; it also details his role in obtaining third country funding for the Contras after Congress terminated U.S. support in 1984. The document further evaluates Reagan's responses in two official inquiries to determine whether they rise to the level of perjury. For a variety of reasons, Mixter's opinion is that "there is no basis for a criminal prosecution" of Reagan in each of the areas under scrutiny, although he notes that it is a "close legal call" on the issue of arms sales to Iran.

Document 2

Office of the Independent Counsel, C.J. Mixter to Judge Walsh, "Criminal Liability of President Bush," March 21, 1991, 89 pages.

In this assessment, Mixter traces then-Vice President Bush's involvement in both sides of the Iran-Contra operations, including his meeting with a high Israeli official on the sales of arms to Iran in July 1986, and his presence at no fewer than a dozen meetings during which illicit assistance to the Contras was discussed. The legal evaluation also contains a detailed overview of Bush's role in arranging a quid pro quo deal with two Presidents of Honduras in order to garner Honduran support for allowing the Contras to use that country as a base of operations against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. "It is quite clear that Mr. Bush attended most (although not quite all) of the key briefings and meetings in which Mr. Reagan participated, and therefore can be presumed to have known many of the Iran/Contra facts that the former President knew." But since Bush was subordinate to Reagan, his role as a "secondary officer" rendered him less likely to be criminally liable for the actions he took.

The Mixter memo on Bush was written before the existence and cover-up of the Vice President's diaries became known in late 1992. The Independent Counsel's office did launch an investigation into why the diaries were not previously turned over and considered bringing charges against the former Vice President for illegally withholding them.

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More – The Top 5 Declassified Iran-Contra Historical Documents:

Document 1
NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, "Subject: Central America," SECRET, June 25, 1984

At a pivotal meeting of the highest officials in the Reagan Administration, the President and Vice President and their top aides discuss how to sustain the Contra war in the face of mounting Congressional opposition. The discussion focuses on asking third countries to fund and maintain the effort, circumventing Congressional power to curtail the CIA's paramilitary operations. In a remarkable passage, Secretary of State George P. Shultz warns the president that White House adviser James Baker has said that "if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense." But Vice President George Bush argues the contrary: "How can anyone object to the US encouraging third parties to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas…? The only problem that might come up is if the United States were to promise to give these third parties something in return so that some people could interpret this as some kind of exchange." Later, Bush participated in arranging a quid pro quo deal with Honduras in which the U.S. did provide substantial overt and covert aid to the Honduran military in return for Honduran support of the Contra war effort.

Document 2

White House, Draft National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," TOP SECRET, (with cover memo from Robert C. McFarlane to George P. Shultz and Caspar W. Weinberger), June 17, 1985

The secret deals with Iran were mainly aimed at freeing American hostages who were being held in Lebanon by forces linked to the Tehran regime. But there was another, subsidiary motivation on the part of some officials, which was to press for renewed ties with the Islamic Republic. One of the proponents of this controversial idea was National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, who eventually took the lead on the U.S. side in the arms-for-hostages deals until his resignation in December 1985. This draft of a National Security Decision Directive, prepared at his behest by NSC and CIA staff, puts forward the argument for developing ties with Iran based on the traditional Cold War concern that isolating the Khomeini regime could open the way for Moscow to assert its influence in a strategically vital part of the world. To counter that possibility, the document proposes allowing limited amounts of arms to be supplied to the Iranians. The idea did not get far, as the next document testifies.

Document 3

Defense Department, Handwritten Notes, Caspar W. Weinberger Reaction to Draft NSDD on Iran (with attached note and transcription by Colin Powell), June 18, 1985

While CIA Director William J. Casey, for one, supported McFarlane's idea of reaching out to Iran through limited supplies of arms, among other approaches, President Reagan's two senior foreign policy advisers strongly opposed the notion. In this scrawled note to his military assistant, Colin Powell, Weinberger belittles the proposal as "almost too absurd to comment on ... It's like asking Qadhafi to Washington for a cozy chat." Richard Armitage, who is mentioned in Powell's note to his boss, was an assistant secretary of defense at the time and later became deputy secretary of state under Powell.

Document 4

Diary, Caspar W. Weinberger, December 7, 1985

The disastrous November HAWK shipment prompted U.S. officials to take direct control of the arms deals with Iran. Until then, Israel had been responsible for making the deliveries, for which the U.S. agreed to replenish their stocks of American weapons. Before making this important decision, President Reagan convened an extraordinary meeting of several top advisers in the White House family quarters on December 7, 1985, to discuss the issue. Among those attending were Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Both men objected vehemently to the idea of shipping arms to Iran, which the U.S. had declared a sponsor of international terrorism. But in this remarkable set of notes, Weinberger captures the president's determination to move ahead regardless of the obstacles, legal or otherwise: "President sd. he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge that 'big strong President Reagan passed up chance to free hostages.'"

Document 5

NSC, Oliver L. North Memorandum, "Release of American Hostages in Beirut," (so-called "Diversion Memo"), TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE, April 4, 1986

At the center of the public's perception of the scandal was the revelation that the two previously unconnected covert activities -- trading arms for hostages with Iran and backing the Nicaraguan Contras against congressional prohibitions -- had become joined. This memo from Oliver North is the main piece of evidence to survive which spells out the plan to use "residuals" from the arms deals to fund the rebels. Justice Department investigators discovered it in North's NSC files in late November 1986. For unknown reasons it escaped North's notorious document "shredding party" which took place after the scandal became public.

These materials are reproduced from www.nsarchive.org with the permission of the National Security Archive

D.R. Congo: Wanted DRC mass rapist and election candidate speaks to Al Jazeera

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, campaigning for Monday's elections is drawing to a close.

One of the 65 candidates is Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, who has been formally charged with the mass rape of 387 people.

Sheka is running for one of the two seats available for the Walikale district in the North Kivu province, in the country's politically volatile eastern region.

He held his only rally in Walikale on Thursday.

In this Al Jazeera exclusive, Sheka spoke to Al Jazeera's Peter Greste in Walikale.

Syria: UN rights panel voices alarm at reported torture of children

UN - A United Nations panel today voiced deep concern about massive human rights violations in Syria, including the reported torture of children, as the Government’s violent crackdown against protesters continues.

The UN Committee against Torture, which is concluding its 47th session in Geneva, has reviewed “numerous, consistent and substantiated” reports and information about widespread rights violations in the country, it stated in a news release.

The violations include cases of torture and ill-treatment of detainees; rife or systematic attacks against civilian population, including the killing of peaceful demonstrators and the use of excessive of force against them; and the persecutions of human rights defenders and activists.

“Of particular concern are reports referring to children who have suffered torture and mutilation while detained, as well as cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, arbitrary detention by police forces and the military, and enforced and involuntary disappearances,” stressed Claudio Grossman, who currently heads the 10-member expert panel.

More than 3,500 people have died in Syria since an uprising, similar to the protests demanding reforms in other countries across North Africa and the Middle East, began early this year.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and other top UN officials have repeatedly called for an end to the killings in Syria, accountability for the crimes committed and the protection of human rights.

Mr. Ban remains extremely concerned at the escalating crisis, and welcomed the efforts of the League of Arab States to end the bloodshed and promote a political solution, UN spokesperson Martin Nesirky told reporters in New York today.

“The Secretary-General welcomes in particular the Arab League’s proposal to send an observer mission to protect civilians in Syria, and strongly urges the Syrian authorities to give their consent and full cooperation,” he stated, adding that Mr. Ban stands ready to provide support.

The Committee said it is alarmed by the fact that the reports of massive human rights violations are occurring amid “total and absolute impunity,” as prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations have not been undertaken in such cases.

“These generalised abuses are allegedly conducted under direct orders from public authorities, at their instigation or with their consent or acquiescence,” Mr. Grossman said.

The Committee is tasked with monitoring the implementation of the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which has been ratified by 149 States, including Syria.

It requested the Government to provide it with a special report by 9 March 2012 that indicates the measures it is taking to ensure effective implementation of the Convention, as well as information on the events occurring in the country the Committee has referred to.

The expert panel will review the special report during its next session in May 2012.

In a related development, the head of the UN agency tasked with defending press freedom today condemned the brutal killing of Syrian cameraman Ferzat Jarban and called on the authorities to respect the basic right of freedom of expression.

Mr. Jarban was reportedly arrested after filming anti-Government protests in al-Qasir on 19 November, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) said in a news release. His “severely mutilated” body was found the next morning.

“This ruthless attack must not go unpunished,” stated UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova. “It is a violation of the basic human right of freedom of expression and of journalists’ inalienable right and duty to carry out their work in safety and without hindrance.

“I call on the Government of Syria to stop all forms of violence against journalists immediately. I also appeal to the authorities to put an end to flagrant repression against those who report on current events in the country,” she added.

According to the non-governmental Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Mr. Jarban is the first journalist reported to have been killed since the crackdown against protesters began eight months ago. The group is investigating a number of cases concerning journalists who have gone missing in the country.

Egypt: Poland 1989 and Egypt 2011

By Patrycja Sasnal*
Courtesy IDN-InDepth News Viewpoint**

MONTPELLIER (IDN) - Most sober Middle East analysts have already put the Muslim Brotherhood in the 'losers' basket. Part of this has been in response to the exaggerated threat of 'radicalism' purported by the mainstream media.

But based on the Polish experience of religion's role in political transition, one cannot help thinking that we have not seen the last of the Muslim Brotherhood yet. Quite the contrary: if it acts cautiously, the movement can win more hearts and minds in the short run before it starts losing credibility among a brand new generation of Egyptians. Here's why.

The comparisons between Polish transition in 1989 and Egyptian revolution 2011 have not been given much thought. Like apples and oranges, they are different but they are both fruit: deeply religious societies that managed to dismantle oppressive systems in a peaceful manner.

In Poland it happened at the Round Table in 1989 where the opposition sat down with regime representatives in the presence of the Catholic Church to agree on semi-free parliamentary elections. In Egypt a popular movement that included all breeds of political and social forces ousted the president and invested their pro-democratic aspirations in the army.

Despite all the differences the reasons behind both revolutions share similarities. The main internal factor of change in Poland was the tragic condition of the economy: "We want bread and freedom" was the demonstrators' slogan in the 1980s (think of the Egyptian bread riots in the 1970s). There was literally nothing in the stores but they remained open.

My only childhood memory of chocolate is my mother's inexplicable invention of a substance resembling the original only in colour and texture.

But in the late 1980s the Polish regime tried to reform, unsuccessfully. The level of social rage grew constantly. Precisely the same has happened in Egypt over the past decade. Although the Egyptian economy is not centrally planned in its entirety, the level of impoverishment and social anger paralleled the Polish example in spite of the economic reforms.

Egyptians, like my mother and all Poles, wanted their dignity back.

In part, both societies' religiosity and politicisation of religion inspired that quest. I do not mean to compare the Catholic Church and the Muslim Brotherhood per se. Neither do I ignore the obvious differences between Christianity and Islam: but there are some parallels and interesting questions that arise.

Roots and riots

Ninety-five percent of Poles declare themselves religious (and Catholic) compared to 98 percent of Egyptians. Both regimes then, in Poland and Egypt, feared the power of religion. In Egypt it was concealed behind a facade of embracing official Islam via Al-Azhar (though the prominent Mosque rarely engaged politically and openly served the state) and amid repression of the politically-active Muslim Brotherhood.

The division by the late French orientalist Maxime Rodinson between official Islam (controlled by the state) and the popular one (expressed by the people themselves) is tricky in Egypt. The strength of the Muslim Brotherhood is that it has managed to stay between the two realms.

It found a way to operate within the system, winning a significant number of seats in parliament, and at the same time never ceased to epitomise the anti-regime struggle. This in-between status gives its policies greater flexibility, which is an advantage in any tumultuous time.

In Poland for the most part of the Communist era the Catholic Church, albeit in opposition to the regime, was able to function fairly autonomously until it engaged in political and social debate, mainly after 1978 when a Pole became pope.

Out of the wave of workers' protests in 1980 emerged Solidarnosc – a peculiar amalgam that included trade unionists, leftists and people associated with the Catholic church. Later, the Egyptian 'Kefaya' - a grassroots movement of mostly leftist and Islamist activists - would parallel the birth of Solidarnosc.

In the Polish mindset, Catholicism lay at the roots of the notion of the Polish nation: it linked Solidarity with the 'good old times' of pre-war Poland. The country regained independence in 1918 after 123 years of non-existence. Egypt waited 121 years after Napoleon's invasion until the 1919 revolution to get rid of British colonial rule.

It may be too simplistic an analogy, but certainly the idea of being the de facto 'leader of the Muslim world' was already imprinted in the Egyptian national psyche.

Religious roots go deep. Even though today the majority of Egyptians do not seem to accept the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, they do not openly criticise it, primarily because it would put them on a par with the regime and because the brotherhood enjoys high esteem.

Similarly, in Poland the respect and political engagement on behalf of the opposition let the Catholic Church play an important part in the transitional period. It joined the Round Table (as an observer) and supported the subsequent reforms. It also gave the revolution a moral flavor. After the brief moment of anti-regime unity, however, a more pluralist political scene evolved.

1989 versus 2011

At first, transitional-period democracy naturally evokes conflict. Old associations break up, groups take care of their own business. The new, inexperienced parties usually play on basic social discomforts.

In Poland living conditions deteriorated drastically after 1989. We went from virtually zero unemployment to 11 percent in 1991 and to 250 percent inflation in only one year's time. In the short run we can certainly expect even greater economic hardship in Egypt. In fact, we are already witnessing it. Egyptian socio-demographic problems are far greater than those of Poland in 1989.

The danger here is that politicised religion thrives on the dispossessed. The disappointed look to the 'good old times' – some may even support the post-Mubarak NDP party just as many Poles clung to the post-Communist elite. But some will choose the Muslim Brotherhood, given the fluidity and pro-social character of their policies. In Poland even the radical catholic Christian National Union, a marginal offshoot of Solidarity, won 8.7 percent votes in 1991.

This matters in the immediate future in Egypt because the nature of the country's legal and educational systems will come up for debate (according to 66 percent of Egyptians shari'a must be the only source of state legislation).

These are the most divisive secularisation-related issues. In Poland they were quickly dealt with. In 1990, Catholic religion was introduced in public schools, with two classes a week for a duration of 12 years. In 1993 abortion was made illegal. These were the immediate gains for the church as a result of its political and social influence.

In Egypt religious gains in the realm of politics will depend on the interaction between Al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood. The two have traditionally been in conflict. Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, the imam of Al-Azhar, faces a daunting task of restoring the institution's status. If he manages to do so – and he does have a window of opportunity in the transitional period – it would counterbalance the Muslim Brotherhood, giving the religious scene a healthy pluralistic tone.

It is the laymen who insulate politics from religion. Crippled by decades of marginalisation, the secular opposition needs to mobilise and organise quickly. In Poland, post-transformation gutter politics saw a split in the Solidarnosc movement, the emergence of hundreds of tiny political parties, a nasty blame game and populism. The phenomenon of a politicised church also grew into extreme forms: the popularity of Radio Maryja, a chauvinist, anti-Semitic Catholic radio station, is a perfect example.

Money and literacy

But as Polish society modernised and got richer with time in the late 1990s and 2000s, the Catholic Church struggled to find its place in the public sphere. What Egypt badly needs now is a fast-working technocratic team which could at least partially avert public discontent. That might eventually be the best shield against a growing politicisation of religion. Later on, with improved living conditions, yet another generation will emerge in public life, one that may be more secular.

But for the time being Egyptians are becoming more and more religious. Unsurprisingly perhaps since the literacy rate in Egypt does not exceed 66 percent (it was 99 percent in 1989 in Poland). The strength of secular forces might be further weakened by the reaction of external actors. The Yes-No-Maybe response of US President Barack Obama to the protests made Egyptians feel deprived of Western support. Poles were convinced that the US and the West were behind them, be it true or not.

Apart from Turkey, who can the Egyptians count on? At first Egyptians are likely to count on the Muslim Brotherhood. Should we make bets on the secular character of Egyptian politics just because young people use Facebook?

If Poland is to serve as a precedent, as a country which really wanted to Westernise but which ended up struggling with its own religiosity, it seems that in Egypt religion will not only stay in the public sphere and in political life, but will thrive there, at least initially.

* Patrycja Sasnal is a Middle East analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs and a Fulbright scholar at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

**Parts of this article – first published on EU Observer – were included in a presentation she made at the International Conference 'Policymakers' Responsibility in a Changing World. The Mediterranean: The Waves of Change' organised by the New Policy Forum (Gorbachev Forum) on Nov. 24-25, 2011 in Montpellier, France. [IDN-InDepthNews – November 25, 2011]

Sudan: Some 76,000 people fleeing conflict in Sudan enter Ethiopia, South Sudan

Sudanese refugees from Blue Nile state cross into western Ethiopia through the Kurmuk border crossing

Source: UN

The United Nations refugee agency voiced concern today over the movement of large numbers of people from Sudan into Ethiopia and South Sudan, saying that an estimated 76,000 people have moved since August, mainly as a result of conflicts.

Of the estimated 36,000 Sudanese refugees who moved towards Ethiopia, up to 17,000 have been transferred to camps, according to Raouf Mazou, the Deputy Director UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) African Bureau in charge of Eastern, Horn of Africa, Chad and Sudan.

The challenge UNHCR is facing is that the refugees have gone to extremely remote locations which are difficult to reach, Mr. Mazou told reporters in Geneva. Assistance had been provided by helicopter, he said, adding that up to 100,000 Sudanese could enter Ethiopia and South Sudan in the coming few weeks if the current trend continues.

Meanwhile, efforts are under way to encourage people to relocate from the Yida refugee site in South Sudan’s Unity State to safer area further south away from the border, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The refugees fled fighting in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan state.

South Sudan has also been receiving refugees crossing from Sudan’s Blue Nile state.

Hate Crimes: FBI Asked to Probe Internet Threats to Mosques

SOURCE Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)

A prominent national Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization today called on the FBI to investigate a number of threats of violence targeting mosques posted online on an anti-Islam hate site, including the comment "I want [Muslim] blood on my hands" by an individual who claims he regularly drives past a Virginia mosque.

The Washington-based Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) also urged WordPress.com to remove the hate site because its calls to violence violate the hosting company's terms of service," which prohibit blogs that "contain threats or incite violence towards individuals or entities."

[NOTE: At CAIR's request, WordPress.com last year deleted a similar blog containing posts that advocated burning mosques, making false bomb threats implicating Muslims, desecrating Muslim graves, and that recommended the "proper way to shoot a muslim [sic]."]

CAIR said articles and comments posted on the anonymous blog "Bare Naked Islam" (BNI) routinely urge attacks on and desecration of American and European mosques.

[NOTE: Grammatical errors have been maintained for all posts and comments below.]

"Keith Mahone (aka Charles Martel)," who states that he regularly drives by a Virginia mosque, wrote: "[I]f you see a Muslim licking an ice cream cone in the park and you blow his head off you are technically committing an act of self defense. . .Muslims must learn they they are not safe anywhere outside a Muslim country. . .My heart does a back flip to see a mosque "desecrated". . .Burn every mosque to the ground in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and kill every Muslim twice. . .I want their blood on my hands as a matter of principle."

SEE: Keith Mahone (aka Charles Martel)

http://tinyurl.com/7akyxfr

In a November 23 post headlined "Ready the Pigs' Blood," the blog's author and commenters on the article urged violence and religious desecration to prevent the construction of a New York mosque.

SEE: Ready the Pigs' Blood

http://www.cair.com/barenakedislam/1.htm

BNI's author wrote: "The mosque may go up, but it will never stay up."

Commenter "angel" wrote: "I hope the tough Russians will burn this mosque to the ground many times over until the a**lifters get the message."

"Sarastro" wrote: "Ban all mosques, blow up those that exist, and do not let another inch of sacred American soil be designated to be desecrated by Islamic buildings. Let's hope the Russian Mafia will find the right remedy for this outrage."

"Carl Tapp" wrote: "Bay people must contaminate the ground, buildings, and Muslims with the blood, urine and guts of pigs."

"Kenneth Schustereit" commented, "Fill this hole with pig's blood!" while "perry" wrote: "a lil pigs blood applied here and there."

In reply to these threats "barenakedislam" suggested: "Perry, pouring [pig blood] in the cement would be better. They couldn't wash it away." The blog's author later wrote: "I sincerely doubt that mosque will ever get to the point where they are blaring the Call to Prayer at 5AM. Mr. BNI has a Russian Jewish business associate from that neighborhood. He will know what they are going to do but I doubt if he will tell us. Probably better that way."

Another BNI November 23 post headlined "WOO HOO! Yet ANOTHER anti-Muslim attack on a French mosque" asks, "Will the Muslims ever get a clue that they are not welcome in France?"

SEE: WOO HOO! Yet ANOTHER anti-Muslim attack on a French mosque

http://www.cair.com/barenakedislam/2.htm

A comment to that post by "Sarastro" stated: "What's all this pussy-footing??? Throw 10 Molotov cocktails into these mosques and burn them down even with a**-lifters in them, especially with a**-lifters in them."

"GrouchyFogie" wrote: "Bomb the things to the ground, THEN burn them."

"Burnerjack" wrote: "THAT'S not an attack. An attack is boarding the doors while the mosque is full and then fire bombing it. THAT'S an attack. I'm just saying."

"Calls to violence and desecration targeting an American religious minority should never be tolerated and must be investigated by the FBI and other relevant law enforcement authorities," said CAIR National Communications Director Ibrahim Hooper. "Too many American mosques have already been targeted by those who share the extremist views expressed on this hate site."

He noted that in the past year, mosques or mosque construction sites in Massachusetts, Oregon, Ohio, New York, Iowa, Maine, Georgia, Missouri, Louisiana, Tennessee, Texas, California, and Michigan have been targeted by arson, vandalism or threats.

In May of last year, a bomb exploded at a Florida mosque. A recent fire at a Kansas mosque is still under investigation.

Hooper said a number of recent reports have documented the growth and promotion of Islamophobia nationwide.

International Relations: EU-US Summit in Washington to Further Strengthen the Transatlantic Partnership

SOURCE Delegation of the European Union to the United States

The EU-US Summit will take place in Washington, DC, on Monday, November 28. The European Union will be represented by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso. High Representative Catherine Ashton and EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht will also attend the summit. The United States will be represented by President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other representatives of the US administration.

Before his departure to the United States, President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy said: "I look forward to discussing the state of the global economy, including the European sovereign debt crisis, with President Obama. We, the EU and the United States, have the strongest trade and economic relationship in the world and remain partners of first resort. We will both need to take action to address the near-term growth concerns as well as fiscal and financial vulnerabilities. Together, we will also look for ways to use our very strong economic ties for creating growth and jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.

In addition to our discussions on the economy we will also take time to touch upon some of the current international issues where the EU and US cooperation has been intense since the last summit. We will in this regard discuss the Middle East, North Africa and the EU's eastern neighborhood."

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said: "With the world economy going through times of uncertainty and major changes occurring in the international system, the transatlantic relationship is more relevant than ever. I look forward to discuss with President Obama how to face today's challenges in a concerted manner. We are each other's strategic partners and staunch allies. We need to work together to ensure long-lasting, and balanced growth worldwide. We need also to develop a transatlantic agenda to growth and jobs. Deepening the transatlantic economic relationship - the most relevant and integrated in the world - is part of the answer to create more and better jobs.

But today's globalised world is not just about economy but also about values and standards. In this sense we will also be discussing how to increase our international cooperation and build a stronger and fairer rules-based system."

The main focus of the summit will be the global economic situation. Leaders are expected to discuss the EU and US responses to the crisis and how to support growth and job creation. They will also debate global challenges such as climate change and energy and development cooperation. A range of foreign policy issues, including the Arab Spring, Iran, Syria, the Middle East Peace Process and Afghanistan, as well as the EU's Eastern neighborhood will also be addressed.

An EU-US Energy Council will take place on the same day whereas the Transatlantic Economic Council and the EU-US Development Dialogue are scheduled for Tuesday, November 29.